Marks And Spencer: Growth and Global Strategy

Marks And Spencer: Growth and Global Strategy Marks and Spencer, originally known as Penny Bazaars, was founded by Michael Marks in 1884 as a clothing sales company in Northern England. Thomas Spencer joined Michael Marks ten years after its startup, becoming co-owner of the company. The company has continued to work under the name of Marks Spencer (MS) since 1894. It became a phenomenon, first in its country of origin, the UK, and later internationally. American chain stores influenced MS to start selling both food and clothes in the 1920s. The company saw itself grow from 1894 to 1939, by opening a staggering 234 stores. MS worked in close cooperation with its suppliers and made strategies for the use of new technologies which in turn led to the highest quality in its products. The company had future foresight thus adding internationalization and product diversification to its strategy in the late 80s. Over the years it took over its competitors, as a major retailer selling diverse product ranges under their own exclusive bra nd in more than 30 countries. Marks and Spencer can be proud of leading the race over all its major competitors in the key areas of quantity, quality, and trust, breadth of range and customer service. MS decided to close one of its stores in Edmonton, along with 14 other stores in Canada, with the 8 remaining stores being closed in a short span of one month. This brought an end to Marks and Spencers 26-year run in Canada. Marks and Spencer were never successful in Canada, said Fin, director of Canadian Institute of Retailing and Services Studies at the University of Alberta. Mounting losses and a retail economy that was fierce and competitive had forced them out of the Canadian market. (Le Riche 1999). The expansion into new retail territory is part of MSs pledge to create a viable business in the Peoples Republic within the next five years. MS has endured a difficult introduction to the retail scene in China from the prosaic and workaday supply chain problems and sizing and pricing issues, to the sacking of the China boss and a death in-store shortly after opening. MS with the help of market research and focus groups are making improvements. At present they have their own buying team in China and their sizing is much better. (Thorniley 2010) In comparison, their entry strategies into Indian Market were a different predicament that MS had to face. Most Indian shoppers were of the idea that MS did not offer the same products as they did internationally. (Jack 2011). MS undermined the Indian market due to its vastness and complexities thus their strategies were deformed leading to problems such as products being over priced which lacked the affordability factor. From 2000 till 2007, MS allowed its former franchisee in India, Planet Retail, to treat it as an up-market rather than a mid-market brand, pricing MS goods even higher than in the UK, and it failed to adapt what it offered to local tastes. In 2008, frustrated that Planet Retail had opened just 10 stores in the seven years since it signed up with MS, the UK-based supermarket chain ended the relationship and in the same year re-launched in a joint venture with Reliance Industries. During its substantial growth, one can note changes in the methods of operation undertaken by Marks Spencer. They were confident they knew what was right for their customers and would be able to satisfy their needs in the long run and this level of belief would help them succeed. This is why they refused to bring changes to the things they did. On examining the expansion of Marks Spencer, one can conclude that the primary reason for their failure to succeed was that they tried to force their tried-and-tested strategy on a market that had their own unique culture and refused to change. As a result, Marks Spencer was forced to bring their expansion plans to a standstill and eventually pulled out. MS always had a much conformed formula which included identical layout, store design, training and so on. They also insisted on using only British suppliers. It was not a very wise decision in 1998 as at the time, plans were made to conquer the European and American markets which had totally different cultures to the British. They believed that customers thought that they received higher quality from British suppliers. From past experience, they implemented their tried and tested formula in various overseas markets. This strategy backfired bringing in a drastic fall in the share price and profits. However, the CEO at the time, Sir Richard Greenbury, insisted that the profit loss was due to the competitive environment. There were many reports that MS no longer understood the customers needs and had misread its target market. Looking into various factors as to why internationalization failed in regard to MS, there are various inter-connecting reasons. Analysts suggest that Greenbury gave focus only to the day-to-day operations of the organization rather than give priority to their long-term strategic plans which needed to be altered. Elements that contributed to the success of Marks and Spencer in UK did not apply to the global market. The long-sustained buy-British policy, the distinctiveness of the retail operation, the priority on a British brand alone and the lack of clear retail positioning and design, all presented problems in the global situation. Another reason behind it was the inexperience of  decentralized control of businesses. When the crisis became inevitable, the reaction was to quickly to distance themselves from this global operation. As Lassarre (2007) commented on Global Strategy, a company needs to possess Global ambitions, Global position, Global business system and Global organization structure processes along with the coordination of human resource management to have a competitive advantage. MS needs to improve on its management and global supply chain. For an organization to survive, change management is critically important in their respective market. It is essential for an organization to understand that every market is in a state of imbalance. Marks and Spencer lacked itself in analyzing their market, finding out what the current trends were, what their customers wanted, and this is one reason why they struggle to keep their customers. The company failed to change with the changing times of their market though being dominant for many years. Finally they found themselves struggling to keep their customers satisfied or even keep their customers. Looking closely at the MS business model, Mellahi (2005) stresses that marketing strategy and its supply chain are some of the reasons for the deterioration of this companys sales and its profits. The buying team behind MS had no contact with customers. MS defines its new creations completely blindly from its customers or its potential customers expectations and demands. Another reason behind the financial decline of MS was the inaccurate supply chain strategy. MS was capable of a well-defined warehouse, sufficient suppliers, structured store network and also had a cost-efficient supply chain. Although a boon, such a supply chain lacks in flexibility. In this scenario MS found it difficult to restructure its  production planning during the one-year product development phase. If a new trend occurred during the one-year development period, it was too late to change all its orders because its suppliers already ordered all the raw materials. Another weakness in the MS supply chain was that it was completely decentralized. MS lacked in one aspect namely being a self-supplier for any products sold in its store. Although St.Micheal was its own brand, it was produced by suppliers. Since all its suppliers were external, it had no flexibility to change any order or to manage the purchase of raw materials or the purchase of semi-finished products. After a century of being leaders in the textile industry, MS should rectify its economic situation and its market image in order to regain its place in the competition among its adversaries. If MS changed its supply chain by using a responsive supply chain instead of the cost-efficient one, like Zara, it would have more flexibility to follow the trend changes and adapt its product to market demand. This will prevent MS from losing its customers because of inaccurate forecasts and building up inaccurate inventory. MS could also adapt its marketing strategy to the growing trends in the textile market. MS should maintain a direct contact with customers thus directing their creations based on the desires of prospective customers. Using this method, it can attract new customers without the fear of losing its loyal customers. This method can also enable MS to have adequate inventory to respond the market demand and to avoid build up of the unneeded inventory. The company needs more changes in order to avoid further  financial problems.(Rankine 1998).To prevent troubles in the future, MS should work and coordinate closely with its suppliers to implement a flexible  production system within their plants. This will allow suppliers to respond to any order changes on time with demanded products. MS obtains most of its products from suppliers implemented in the UK which are relatively expensive than those in European or Asian countries. MS should adopt a new global sourcing strategy where purchasing products from cheaper sources can reduce supplies cost thereby increasing profit margin. Philosophy of Education: Reflection Paper Philosophy of Education: Reflection Paper ABSTRACT My philosophy of education stems from the years of seeing my mother in-law attend classes in order to attain a more lucrative position in her field of business. The visions of her sitting at the table with a pencil in one hand, a highlighter in the other and her Bible perusing several books, newspaper articles, and her personal notes, gave me the insight to strive for a better life. My mother in-law was and still is a firm believer the she can achieve anything with Christ and that her degree was attainable. Seeing my mother in-law so engaged helped me realize the importance of education, becoming a lifelong learner and the possibilities that could be discovered by being a continuous and active learner. Getting a good education was a constant phrase reiterated daily in my household with my children. I understood that education was the common denominator for success and the foundation in which all other professions are based. My goal is to impart into children to be productive citizens , lifelong learners and have a love for God and learning. Keywords: learning, education, children, success Introduction Working in the public educational setting as a Parent Liaison has afforded me the opportunity to gain a greater appreciation for education and its importance. In my past experiences, I have noticed the number of students entering school being unable to read, recall, infer or comprehend. These situations with students caused my heart to ache for their learning. I have witnessed beginning kindergartners with no phonemic awareness, very little sight word recognition, and little to no awareness of school and its importance. My daily mission is to instill the value of education in my students and its direct alignment to both their salvation and success in their life. Regularly, I question students regarding their future goals, dreams, and how education will play an intricate part in their success and achieving those goals. Education is the core element in which all other professions are based and rooted. Every profession involves the human connection of educating and pouring into the spir it. I believe that all students can learn and that learning is a lifelong process that can be achieved with students, parents, and the community. Worldview Philosophy of Life Having received grace to be able to walk through this universe for over 50 years, I have come to realize the result of your daily life is the efforts that put forth into the universe. Understanding that people are complicated and hold various experiences is the key to maturity and adult growth. Recognizing this can be a difficult task if the individual is not conscientious in the moment. We are human beings and continuously deal in the flesh. Our emotions can sometimes overtake our conscientiousness which causes the head to lead as opposed to the heart. This view is shared daily with my students as I try to promote the value of education. School life is my life, and my daily mission is not a job but a calling. It is an opportunity to have a positive impact on students and their futures. Pouring quality information into my students in most cases is the only positive affirmation some of them may receive. My ability to breathe positivity into my students spirit may be the only spark that ignites the spirit and assist the students in moving forward within this world. Life challenges my daily practice as a Parent Liaison (educator). However, I am solid in my belief of knowing that education and true quality of education is the foundation and path to any successful career. The connection between school and active learning is synonymous with success and prosperity. Active learning is essential for a full and productive life. With education, one must be intentional, attentive and conscientious of and recognize the value of the presented opportunities. This active involvement makes the work meaningful and creates success. According to Froebels educational philosophy in order for this to take place the student must be in a happy, harmonious environment in which he or she can grow and the whole person can be built (Gutek, 1995). Christians are human beings, and the flesh is part of that existence. The challenges of a Christians daily walk are directly aligned with some of the issues facing our educational system. Christians and teachers (who are Christians) are passionate regarding showing others the purpose of life and being grounded in their personal beliefs, owning that belief, and sharing that belief. In some cases, both teachers and Christians are held in high regard. Their actions must correlate with internal beliefs and be an example for their students and others. Romans 12:2 (ESV) Do not be conformed to this world, but be transformed by the renewal of your mind, that by testing you may discern what is the will of God, what is good and acceptable and perfect. Philosophy of Schools Learning Being in public education for over twenty years, I have come to realize that building positive relationships is the connection between school and learning. Students come to school with various experiences and unclaimed baggage. As educators, it is important that we recognize and attend and teach the whole child while leaving no stone unturned. Todays educational system and its students does not allow for antiquated and traditional settings and behaviors. The structural settings no longer require students to stay seated in straight rows while the teacher lectures. Because todays students are different, the learning must be different and presented in a manner at the students present level of understanding. Teachers must utilize various pedagogical methods to meet the varying needs of the learners. The learners must be able to actively engage in the process of learning, which includes but not limited to developing critical thinking skills through open dialogue and peer interaction. In addition, teachers should ask thought provoking, deep, probing questions, which extends the learners thinking. Because the learner has various learning styles, it is imperative the teacher is equipped with a multitude of instructional practices in order to differentiate the instruction to meet students at their present level of understanding. Active engagement and the promotion of meaningful technology usage assists in bridging the deficit gap and critical understanding. Teachers must educate themselves to become familiar with todays students and their learning styles. Understanding learning styles assists the teacher with the improvement of instructional delivery and overall classroom management. Regarding improved instructional practices, teachers can assist the various learners by creating learning centers that involves active engagement in order to successfully complete an assigned task. Positive peer interaction can motivate each student to do their best. Pestalozzi and Froebels educational philosophies closely relates to what I believe about education students. Johann Pestalozzi believed that every individual could learn and individuals should have a right to an education. He believed that as a society we had a duty to put these things into practice (Bowers and Gehring, 2004). Froebels kindergarten method is not just for kindergarten students, but can be conducive for all students. Educational Practice A Christians beliefs are directly aligned with their daily practices. Both Christians and teachers  travel a path of selflessness while pouring and teaching valuable, eternal lessons. As an educator  we are always looking for ways to be innovative, but we must remember our students. My  educational practice would be more in line with progressivism and social reconstuctionism,  viewing the learner as the central focus. When working with students I will serve as a guide and  facilitator assisting the student in reaching their learning goals. Students will be introduced to  learning centers and work in with partners. Students will take ownership of their work and their  classroom. My goal is assist to students to prepare for the future and to be independent-thinkers.   When presenting new material to our students, make sure that we clarify the purpose and the  learning goals to our students show them models and examples. According to Graham (2009), we  are to apply biblical truth to all of education, and not just parts of it. Our goal is for the student to  be successful. As colleagues we discuss if something is working or not, so why not take the time  with our students to hold classroom discussions about their learning. In this way educators will  be able to observe how the student is grasping the material and if something needs to change. It  is important that students receive feedback from assignments and to give the teacher feedback  about the learning process. Metacognitive strategies will be implemented to so that students are  given the opportunities to plan, monitor their learning, and self-reflect along the learning process.   Teacher-Learner Relationships   Being a teacher is a true calling that only special people can and should answer. The old adage regarding those who can do and those who cannot teach is meaningless and degrading to all who are in the educational profession. Being a teacher is not just standing in front of a class lecturing and students utilizing pencil and paper to record the transferred information. Being a teacher is about the human experience and making a spiritual connection with those whom you are in contact. According to Graham (2009), we are to apply biblical truth to all of the educational process, not just part of it. The role of a both learner and teacher are important for the others existence. The learner is one who challenges the teacher to critically think and ask probing questions in order to extend their mental capacity. In addition, the learner actively engages in the lesson/conversation and acquires relevant information that is prudent to their success. Ultimately, the learner has to be intrinsically motivated to gain knowledge. The role of a quality teacher is able to reach deep within their learners and appeal to their hearts. By doing this, the teacher can make a connection with the learners and guide them appropriately while communicating the importance of an education and allowing them to see and understand to true benefits of their educational journey. Once the connection between learner and teacher have been established, the teacher can speak words of encouragement, life, and longevity into the learner and giving them a great appreciation for education and its value. One cannot exist without each other. Success can only be experienced if the two (learner and teacher) are united. In the public school setting, building teacher/learner relationship is essential. Witnessing various classrooms, I have noticed that teachers who positively interact with their students experience success on a greater level compared to those teachers who do not buy into their students. Mutual respects are the foundation to a successful teacher-student relationship it is the teacher who sets the tone for and models respectful behavior. Once the relationship is established, the ability to pour into our learners is durable. Titus 2:7-8 (ESV), show yourself in all respects to be a model of good works, and in your teaching show integrity, and sound speech that cannot be condemned, so that an opponent may be put to shame, having nothing evil to say about us. Diversity It is very important for teachers to know their learners and how they learn. As stated earlier, life experiences varies and that must be taken into account when educating our youth. Understanding your learners and appreciating their differences is crucial to both their success and the success of the teacher. Being willing to explore those differences give the teacher a concrete understanding of instructional practices that would be benefit their learner. Teachers should be able to utilize various instructional practices to reach their learners and allow them to be successful. It is extremely important to meet the learner at their present level of understanding and grow their knowledge base. The learners life experiences has an impact on their instructional understanding whether positive or negative. As it relates to diversity, Ruby Payne (2001) noted that students experiences and their ability to attain resources plays an intricate part of the learners success. Payne noted that emotional, mental, spiritual, and physical resources are vital learners of diverse background. Colossians 3:11 (ESV), Here there is not Greek and Jew, circumcised and uncircumcised,  barbarian, Scythian, slave, free; but Christ is all, and in all. As educators with diverse learners, we should remember it is not about us, but Christ in us and in our students. Conclusion As stated earlier, education is the root in which all other professions grow. Educating students about the world and the beauty of Gods glory is the most rewarding mission that can ever be experienced. Conflict occurs when teachers are not kept abreast with the change of society. Just as some ministers must utilize unorthodox methods to capture the attention of our youth in order to move them into the church to learn of Gods love, the teacher, in the classroom setting, must research and stay abreast of the various needs of students and their learning styles in order to meet their academic, social and emotional needs. References Bowers, F., Gehring, T. (2004). Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi: 18th Century Swiss Educator and Correctional Reformer. Journal of Correctional Education, 55(4), 306-319. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/23292096 Graham, D. L. (2009).  Teaching redemptively: Bringing grace and truth into your classroom (2nd ed.). Colorado Springs, CO: Purposeful Design Publications. ISBN: 9781583310588. Gutek, G.L. (1995). A history of Western educational experience (2nd ed.) Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press. ISBN: 9780881338188. Johnson, L. (2011). Teaching outside the box: how to grab students by their brains. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, a Wiley Brand. Payne, R.K. (2001). A framework for understanding poverty. Highlands, TX: Aha! Process, Inc. Russell, K.A., Aldridge, J. (2009). Play, unity and symbols: Parallels in the works of Froebel and Jung. International Journal of Psychology and Counseling, 1 (1), 001-004.

Minerals :: essays research papers

Mining is one of the largest commercial jobs. The word mining doesn’t sound very important to ordinary peoples who doesn’t know geology. After I read this book, I knew our culture need industrial minerals more than they need anything else except food, but even food could not be produced without minerals. There are only a few of the world’s five billion people who don’t rely on mineral everyday. Unfortunately, there is many factors concerning these industrial activities. Will it make profit or is it not economically feasible.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Minerals can be found in every part of the earth’s crust, but with two important needs; the concentration of mineral and the size of the deposit. We want to make sure the mineral is high grade and large enough to repay the investment and make profit. Of the many mineral found, there is only a few mineral will appear to have good potential. So it must be tested widely, which costs a lot of time and speed is one of the critical factors. If the construction is financed by loans, it leads up to high interest costs.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  The economics of a mine depends upon ore reserves, grade, type of ore, and the location. In order to mine, many months and millions of dollars have to spend in construction. There are only a few mines are discovered in convenient places, this costs a lot on transportation and labor on such an atmosphere. Construction includes food, health, accommodation and recreation facilities for the hundreds of working man. Water, power, communication, equipment, etc… So in a construction site is almost the same as a little empire. In able to build this, the Industry Company has to make sure the ore they are getting is worth it.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Environmental concerns are global concerns; cost advantages may increase by having higher environmental impacts from mining. This creates air pollution and global problems. In the other hand, the skill of mining delivers benefits to all of the earth’s population. Such as medicine, communication, etc… all provide benefits to human by metals and minerals.

Art After Philosophy (1969) Joseph Kosuth Essay

The fact that it has recently become fashionable for physicists themselves to be sympathetic toward religion . . . marks the physicists’ own lack of confidence in the validity of their hypotheses, which is a reaction on their part from the antireligious dogmatism of nineteenth-century scientists, and a natural outcome of the crisis through which physics has just passed. –A. J. Ayer. . . . once one has understood the Tractatus there will be no temptation to concern oneself anymore with philosophy, which is neither empirical like science nor tautological like mathematics; one will, like Wittgenstein in 1918, abandon philosophy, which, as traditionally understood, is rooted in confusion. –J. O. Urmson. Traditional philosophy, almost by definition, has concerned itself with the unsaid. The nearly exclusive focus on the said by twentieth-century analytical linguistic philosophers is the shared contention that the unsaid is unsaid because it is unsayable. Hegelian philosophy made sense in the nineteenth century and must have been soothing to a century that was barely getting over Hume, the Enlightenment, and Kant.1 Hegel’s philosophy was also capable of giving cover for a defense of religious beliefs, supplying an alternative to Newtonian mechanics, and fitting in with the growth of history as a discipline, as well as accepting Darwinian biology.2 He appeared to give an acceptable resolution to the conflict between theology and science, as well. The result of Hegel’s influence has been that a great majority of contemporary philosophers are really little more than historians of philosophy, Librarians of the Truth, so to speak. One begins to get the impression that there â€Å"is nothing more to be said.† And certainly if one realizes the implications of Wittgenstein’s thinking, and the thinking influenced by him and after him, â€Å"Continental† philosophy need not seriously be considered here.3 Is there a reason for the â€Å"unreality† of philosophy in our time? Perhaps this can be answered by looking into the difference between our time and the centuries preceding us. In the past man’s conclusions about the world were based on the information he had about it – if not specifically like the empiricists, then generally like the rationalists. Often in fact, the closeness between science and philosophy was so great that scientists and philosophers were one and the same person. In fact, from the times of Thales, Epicurus, Heraclitus, and Aristotle to Descartes and Leibnitz, â€Å"the great names in philosophy were often great names in science as well.†4 That the world as perceived by twentieth-century science is a vastly different one than the one of its preceding century, need not be proved here. Is it possible, then, that in effect man has learned so much, and his â€Å"intelligence† is such, that he cannot believe the reasoning of traditional philosophy? That perhaps he knows too much about the world to make those kinds of conclusions? As Sir James Jeans has stated: . . . When philosophy has availed itself of the results of science, it has not been by borrowing the abstract mathematical description of the pattern of events, but by borrowing the then current pictorial description of this pattern; thus it has not appropriated certain knowledge but conjectures. These conjectures were often good enough for the man-sized world, but not, as we now know, for those ultimate processes of nature which control the happenings of the man-sized world, and bring us nearest to the true nature of reality.5 He continues: One consequence of this is that the standard philosophical discussions of many problems, such as those of causality and free will orof materialism or mentalism, are based on an interpretation of the pattern of events which is no longer tenable. The scientific basis of these older discussions has been washed away, and with their disappearance have gone all the arguments . . .6 The twentieth century brought in a time that could be called â€Å"the end of philosophy and the beginning of art.† I do not mean that, of course, strictly speaking, but rather as the â€Å"tendency† of the situation. Certainly linguistic philosophy can be considered the heir to empiricism, but it’s a philosophy in one gear.7 And there is certainly an â€Å"art condition† to art preceding Duchamp, but its other functions or reasons-to-be are so pronounced that its ability to function clearly as art limits its art condition so drastically that it’s only minimally art.8 In no mechanistic sense is there a connection between philosophy’s â€Å"ending† and art’s â€Å"beginning,† but I don’t find this occurrence entirely coincidental. Though the same reasons may be responsible for both occurrences, the connection is made by me. I bring this all up to analyze art’s function and subsequently its viability. And I do so to enable others to understand the reasoning of my – and, by extension, other artists’ – art, as well to provide a clearer understanding of the term â€Å"Conceptual art.†9 THE FUNCTION OF ART The main qualifications to the lesser position of painting is that advances in art are certainly not always formal ones. –Donald Judd (1963). Half or more of the best new work in the last few years has been neither painting nor sculpture. – Donald Judd (1965). Everything sculpture has, my work doesn’t. –Donald Judd (1967). The idea becomes a machine that makes the art. –Sol LeWitt (1965) The one thing to say about art is that it is one thing. Art is art-as-art and everything else is everything else. Art as art is nothing but art. Art is not what is not art. –Ad Reinhardt (1963). The meaning is the use. –Wittgenstein. A more functional approach to the study of concepts has tended to replace the method of introspection. Instead of attempting to grasp or describe concepts bare, so to speak, the psychologist investigates the way in which they function as ingredients in beliefs and in judgments. –Irving M. Copi. Meaning is always a presupposition of function. –T. Segerstedt. . . . the subject matter of conceptual investigations is the meaning of certain words and expressions – and not the things and states of affairs themselves about which we talk, when using those words and expressions. –G. H. Von Wright. Thinking is radically metaphoric. Linkage by analogy is its constituent law or principle, its causal nexus, since meaning only arises through the causal contexts by which a sign stands for (takes the place of) an instance of a sort. To think of anything is to take it as of a sort (as a such and such) and that â€Å"as† brings in (openly or in disguise) the analogy, the parallel, the metaphoric grapple or ground or grasp or draw by which alone the mind takes hold. It takes no hold if there is nothing for it to haul from, for its thinking is the haul, the attraction of likes –I. A. Richards. In this section I will discuss the separation between aesthetics and art; consider briefly formalist art (because it is a leading proponent of the idea of aesthetics as art), and assert that art is analogous to an analytic proposition, and that it is art’s existence as a tautology that enables art to remain â€Å"aloof† from philosophical presumptions. It is necessary to separate aesthetics from art because aesthetics deals with opinions on perception of the world in general. In the past one of the two prongs of art’s function was its value as decoration. So any branch of philosophy that dealt with â€Å"beauty† and thus, taste, was inevitably duty bound to discuss art as well. Out of this â€Å"habit† grew the notion that there was a conceptual connection between art and aesthetics, which is not true. This idea never drastically conflicted with artistic considerations before recent times, not only because the morphological characteristics of art perpetuated the continuity of this error, but as well, because the apparent other â€Å"functions† of art (depiction of religious themes, portraiture of aristocrats, detailing of architecture, etc.) used art to cover up art. When objects are presented within the context of art (and until recently objects always have been used) they are as eligible for aesthetic consideration as are any objects in the world, and an aesthetic consideration of an object existing in the realm of art means that the object’s existence or functioning in an art context is irrelevant to the aesthetic judgment. The relation of aesthetics to art is not unlike that of aesthetics to architecture, in that architecture has a very specific function and how â€Å"good† its design is is primarily related to how well it performs its function. Thus, judgments on what it looks like correspond to taste, and we can see that throughout history different examples of architecture are praised at different times depending on the aesthetics of particular epochs. Aesthetic thinking has even gone so far as to make examples of architecture not related to â€Å"art† at all, works of art in themselves (e.g., the pyramids of Egypt). Aesthetic considerations are indeed always extraneous to an object’s function or â€Å"reason-tobe.† Unless of course, that object’s reason-to-be is strictly aesthetic. An example of a purely aesthetic object is a decorative object, for decoration’s primary function is â€Å"to add something to, so as to make more attractive; adorn; ornament,†10 and this relates directly to taste. And this leads us directly to â€Å"formalist† art and criticism.11 Formalist art (painting and sculpture) is the vanguard of decoration, and, strictly speaking, one could reasonably assert that its art condition is so minimal that for all functional purposes it is not art at all, but pure exercises in aesthetics. Above all things Clement Greenberg is the critic of taste. Behind every one of his decisions is an aesthetic judgment, with those judgments reflecting his taste. And what does his taste reflect? The period he grew up in as a critic, the period â€Å"real† for him: the fifties.12 How else can one account for, given his theories – if they have any logic to them at all – his disinterest in Frank Stella, Ad Reinhardt, and others applicable to his historical scheme? Is it because he is â€Å". . . basically unsympathetic on personally experiential grounds†?13 Or, in other words, â€Å"their work doesn’t suit his taste?† But in the philosophic tabula rasa of art, â€Å"if someone calls it art,† as Don Judd has said, â€Å"it’s art.† Given this, formalist painting and sculpture can be granted an â€Å"art condition,† but only by virtue of their presentation in terms of their art idea (e.g., a rectangular-shaped canvas stretched over wooden supports and stained with such and such colors, using such and such forms, giving such and such a visual experience, etc.). If one looks at contemporary art in this light one realizes the minimal creative effort taken on the part of formalist artists specifically, an d all painters and sculptors (working as such today) generally. This brings us to the realization that formalist art and criticism accepts as a definition of art one that exists solely on morphological grounds. While a vast quantity of similar looking objects or images (or visually related objects or images) may seem to be related (or connected) because of a similarity of visual/experiential â€Å"readings,† one cannot claim from this an artistic or conceptual relationship. It is obvious then that formalist criticism’s reliance on morphology leads necessarily with a bias toward the morphology of traditional art. And in this sense their criticism is not related to a â€Å"scientific method† or any sort of empiricism (as Michael Fried, with his detailed descriptions of paintings and other â€Å"scholarly† paraphernalia would want us to believe). Formalist criticism is no more than an analysis of the physical attributes of particular objects that happen to exist in a morphological context. But this doesn’t add any knowledge (or facts) to our understanding of the nature or function of art. And neither does it comment on whether or not the objects analyzed are even works of art, in that formalist critics always bypass the conceptual element in works of art. Exactly why they don’t comment on the conceptual element in works of art is precisely because formalist art is only art by virtue of its resemblance to earlier works of art. It’s a mindless art. Or, as Lucy Lippard so succinctly described Jules Olitski’s paintings: â€Å"they’re visual Muzak.† 14 Formalist critics and artists alike do not question the nature of art, but as I have said elsewhere: Being an artist now means to question the nature of art. If one is questioning the nature of painting, one cannot be questioning the nature of art. If an artist accepts painting (or sculpture) he is accepting the tradition that goes with it. That’s because the word art is general and the word painting is specific. Painting is a kind of art. If you make paintings you are already accepting (not questioning) the nature of art. One is then accepting the nature of art to be the European tradition of a painting-sculpture dichotomy.15 The strongest objection one can raise against a morphological justification for traditional art is that morphological notions of art embody an implied a priori concept of art’s possibilities. And such an a priori concept of the nature of art (as separate from analytically framed art propositions or â€Å"work,† which I will discuss later) makes it, indeed, a priori: impossible to question the nature of art. And this questioning of the nature of art is a very important concept in understanding the function of art. The function of art, as a question, was first raised by Marcel Duchamp. In fact it is Marcel Duchamp whom we can credit with giving art its own identity. (One can certainly see a tendency toward this self-identification of art beginning with Manet and Cà ©zanne through to Cubism,16 but their works are timid and ambiguous by comparison with Duchamp’s.) â€Å"Modern† art and the work before seemed connected by virtue of their morphology. Another way of putting it would be that art’s â€Å"language† remained the same, but it was saying new things. The event that made conceivable the realization that it was possible to â€Å"speak another language† and still make sense in art was Marcel Duchamp’s first unassisted Ready-made. With the unassisted Ready-made, art changed its focus from the form of the language to what was being said. Which means that it changed the nature of art from a question of morphology to a question of function. This change – one from â€Å"appearance† to â€Å"conception† – was the beginning of â€Å"modern† art and the beginning of conceptual art. All art (after Duchamp) is conceptual (in nature) because art only exists conceptually. The â€Å"value† of particular artists after Duchamp can be weighed according to how much they questioned the nature of art; which is another way of saying â€Å"what they added to the conception of art† or what wasn’t there before they started. Artists question the nature of art by presenting new propositions as to art’s nature. And to do this one cannot concern oneself with the handed-down â€Å"language† of traditional art, as this activity is based on the assumption that there is only one way of framing art propositions. But the very stuff of art is indeed greatly related to â€Å"creating† new propositions. The case is often made – particularly in reference to Duchamp – that objects of art (such as the Ready-mades, of course, but all art is implied in this) are judged as objets d’art in later years and the artists’ intentions become irrelevant. Such an argument is the case of a preconceived notion ordering together not necessarily related facts. The point is this: aesthetics, as we have pointed out, are conceptually irrelevant to art. Thus, any physical thing can become objet d’art, that is to say, can be considered tasteful, aesthetically pleasing, etc. But this has no bearing on the object’s application to an art context; that is, its functioning in an art context. (E.g., if a collector takes a painting, attaches legs, and uses it as a dining table it’s an act unrelated to art or the artist because, as art, that wasn’t the artist’s intention.) And what holds true for Duchamp’s work applies as well to most of the art after him. In other words, the value of Cubism – for instance – is its idea in the realm of art, not the physical or visual qualities seen in a specific painting, or the particularization of certain colors or shapes. For these colors and shapes are the art’s â€Å"language,† not its meaning conceptually as art. To look upon a Cubist â€Å"masterwork† now as art is nonsensical, conceptually speaking, as far as art is concerned. (That visual information that was unique in Cubism’s language has now been generally absorbed and has a lot to do with the way in which one deals with painting â€Å"linguistically.† [E.g., what a Cubist painting meant experimentally and conceptually to, say, Gertrude Stein, is beyond our speculation because the same painting then â€Å"meant† something different than it does now.]) The â€Å"value† now of an original Cubist painting is not unlike, in most respects, an original manuscript by Lord Byron, or The Spirit of St. Louis as it is seen in the Smithsonian Institution. (Indeed, museums fill the very same function as the Smithsonian Institution – why else would the Jeu de Paume wing of the Louvre exhibit Cà ©zanne’s and Van Gogh’s palettes as proudly as they do their paintings?) Actual works of art are little more than historical curiosities. As far as art is concerned Van Gogh’s paintings aren’t worth any more than his palette is. They are both â€Å"collector’s items.†17 Art â€Å"lives† through influencing other art, not by existing as the physical residue of an artist’s ideas. The reason that different artists from the past are â€Å"brought alive† again is because some aspect of their work becomes â€Å"usable† by living artists. That there is no â€Å"truth† as to what art is seems quite unrealized. What is the function of art, or the nature of art? If we continue our analogy of the forms art takes as being art’s language one can realize then that a work of art is a kind of proposition presented within the context of art as a comment on art. We can then go further and analyze the types of â₠¬Å"propositions.† A. J. Ayer’s evaluation of Kant’s distinction between analytic and synthetic is useful to us here: â€Å"A proposition is analytic when its validity depends solely on the definitions of the symbols it contains, and synthetic when its validity is determined by the facts of experience.†18 The analogy I will attempt to make is one between the art condition and the condition of the analytic proposition. In that they don’t appear to be believable as anything else, or be about anything (other than art) the forms of art most clearly finally referable only to art have been forms closest to analytical propositions. Works of art are analytic propositions. That is, if viewed within their context – as art – they provide no information whatsoever about any matter of fact. A work of art is a tautology in that it is a presentation of the artist’s intention, that is, he is saying that that particular work of art is art, which means, is a definition of art. Thus, that it is art is true a priori (which is what Judd means when he states that â€Å"if someone calls it art, it’s art†). Indeed, it is nearly impossible to discuss art in general terms without talking in tautologies – for to attempt to â€Å"grasp† art by any other â€Å"handle† is merely to focus on another aspect or quality of the proposition, which is usually irrelevant to the artwork’s â€Å"art condition.† One begins to realize that art’s â€Å"art condition† is a conceptual state. That the language forms that the artist frames his propositions in are often â€Å"private† codes or languages is an inevitable outcome of art’s freedom from morphological constrictions; and it follows from this that one has to be familiar with contemporary art to appreciate it and understand it. Likewise one understands why the â€Å"man in the street† is intolerant to artistic art and always demands art in a tr aditional â€Å"language.† (And one understands why formalist art sells â€Å"like hot cakes.†) Only in painting and sculpture did the artists all speak the same language. What is called â€Å"Novelty Art† by the formalists is often the attempt to find new languages, although a new language doesn’t necessarily mean the framing of new propositions: e.g., most kinetic and electronic art. Another way of stating, in relation to art, what Ayer asserted about the analytic method in the context of language would be the following: The validity of artistic propositions is not dependent on any empirical, much less any aesthetic, presupposition about the nature of things. For the artist, as an analyst, is not directly concerned with the physical properties of things. He is concerned only with the way (1) in which art is capable of conceptual growth and (2) how his propositions are capable of logically following that growth.19 In other words, the propositions of art are not factual, but linguistic in character – that is, they do not describe the behavior of physical, o r even mental objects; they express definitions of art, or the formal consequences of definitions of art. Accordingly, we can say that art operates on a logic. For we shall see that the characteristic mark of a purely logical inquiry is that it is concerned with the formal consequences of our definitions (of art) and not with questions of empirical fact.20 To repeat, what art has in common with logic and mathematics is that it is a tautology; i.e., the â€Å"art idea† (or â€Å"work†) and art are the same and can be appreciated as art without going outside the context of art for verification. On the other hand, let us consider why art cannot be (or has difficulty when it attempts to be) a synthetic proposition. Or, that is to say, when the truth or falsity of its assertion is verifiable on empirical grounds. Ayer states: . . . The criterion by which we determine the validity of an a priori or analytical proposition is not sufficient to determine the validity of an empirical or synthetic proposition. For it is characteristic of empirical propositions that their validity is not purely formal. To say that a geometrical proposition, or a system of geometrical propositions, is false, is to say that it is self-contradictory. But an empirical proposition, or a system of empirical propositions, may be free from contradiction and still be false. It is said to be false, not because it is formally defective, but because it fails to satisfy some material criterion.21 The unreality of â€Å"realistic† art is due to its framing as an art proposition in synthetic terms: one is always tempted to â€Å"verify† the proposition empirically. Realism’s synthetic state does not bring one to a circular swing back into a dialogue with the larger framework of questions about the nature of art (as does the work of Malevich, Mondrian, Pollock, Reinhardt, early Rauschenberg, Johns, Lichtenstein, Warhol, Andre, Judd, Flavin, LeWitt, Morris, and others), but rather, one is flung out of art’s â€Å"orbit† into the â€Å"infinite space† of the human condition. Pure Expressionism, continuing with Ayer’s terms, could be considered as such: â€Å"A sentence which consisted of demonstrative symbols would not express a genuine proposition. It would be a mere ejaculation, in no way characterizing that to which it was supposed to refer.† Expressionist works are usually such â€Å"ejaculations† presented in the morphological language of traditional art. If Pollock is important it is because he painted on loose canvas horizontally to the floor. What isn’t important is that he later put those drippings over stretchers and hung them parallel to the wall. (In other words what is important in art is what one brings to it, not one’s adoption of what was previously existing.) What is even less important to art is Pollock’s notions of â€Å"self-expression† because those kinds of subjective meanings are useless to anyone other than those involved with him personally. And their â€Å"specific† quality puts them outside of art’s context. â€Å"I do not make art,† Richard Serra says, â€Å"I am engaged in an activity; if someone wants to call it art, that’s his business, but it’s not up to me to decide that. That’s all figured out later.† Serra, then, is very much aware of the implications of his work. If Serra is indeed just â€Å"figuring out what lead does† (gravitationally, molecularly, etc.), why should anyone think of it as art? If he doesn’t take the responsibility of it being art, who can, or should? His work certainly appears to be empirically verifiable: lead can do, and be used for, many physical activities. In itself this does anything but lead us into a dialogue about the nature of art. In a sense then he is a primitive. He has no idea about art. How is it then that we know about â€Å"his activity†? Because he has told us it is art by his actions after â€Å"his activity† has taken place. That is, by the fact that he is with several galleries, puts the physical residue of his activity in museums (and sells them to art collectors – but as we have pointed out, collectors are irrelevant to the â€Å"condition of art† of a work). That he denies his work is art but plays the artist is more than just a paradox. Serra secretly feels that â€Å"arthood† is arrived at empirically. Thus, as Ayer has stated: There are no absolutely certain empirical propositions. It is only tautologies that are certain. Empirical questions are one and all hypotheses, which may be confirmed or discredited in actual sense experience. And the propositions in which we record the observations that verify these hypotheses are themselves hypotheses which are subject to the test of further sense experience. Thus there is no final proposition.22 What one finds all throughout the writings of Ad Reinhardt is this very similar thesis of â€Å"artas-art,† and that â€Å"art is always dead, and a ‘living’ art is a deception.†23 Reinhardt had a very clear idea about the nature of art, and his importance is far from recognized. Because forms of art that can be considered synthetic propositions are verifiable by the world, that is to say, to understand these propositions one must leave the tautological-like framework of art and consider â€Å"outside† information. But to consider it as art it is necessary to ignore this same outside information, because outside information (experiential qualities, to note) has its own intrinsic worth. And to comprehend this worth one does not need a state of â€Å"art condition.† From this it is easy to realize that art’s viability is not connected to the presentation of visual (or other) kinds of experience. That that may have been one of art’s extraneous functions in the preceding centuries is not unlikely. After all, man in even the nineteenth century lived in a fairly standardized visual environment. That is, it was ordinarily predictable as to what he would be coming into contact with day after day. His visual environment in the part of the world in which he lived was fairly consistent. In our time we have an experientially drastically richer environment. One can fly all over the earth in a matter of hours and days, not months. We have the cinema, and color television, as well as the man-made spectacle of the lights of Las Vegas or the skyscrapers of New York City. The whole world is there to be seen, and the whole world can watch man walk on the moon from their living rooms. Certainly art or objects of painting and sculpture cannot be expected to compete experientially with this? The notion of â€Å"use† is relevant to art and its â€Å"language.† Recently the box or cube form has been used a great deal within the context of art. (Take for instance its use by Judd, Morris, LeWitt, Bladen, Smith, Bell, and McCracken – not even mentioning the quantity of boxes and cubes that came after.) The difference between all the various uses of the box or cube form is directly related to the differences in the intentions of the artists. Further, as is particularly seen in Judd’s work, the use of the box or cube form illustrates very well our earlier claim that an object is only art when placed in the context of art. A few examples will point this out. One could say that if one of Judd’s box forms was seen filled with debris, seen placed in an industrial setting, or even merely seen sitting on a street corner, it would not be identified with art. It follows then that understanding and consideration of it as an artwork is necessary a priori to viewing it in order to â€Å"see† it as a work of art. Advance information about the concept of art and about an artist’s concepts is necessary to the appreciation and understanding of contemporary art. Any and all of the physical attributes (qualities) of contemporary works, if considered separately and/or specifically, are irrelevant to the art concept. The art concept (as Judd said, though he didn’t mean it this way) must be considered in its whole. To consider a concept’s parts is invariably to consider aspects that are irrelevant to its art condition – or like reading parts of a definition. It comes as no surprise that the art with the least fixed morphology is the example from which we decipher the nature of the general term â€Å"art.† For where there is a context existing separately of its morphology and consisting of its function one is more likely to find results less conforming and predictable. It is in modern art’s possession of a â€Å"language† with the shortest history that the plausibility of the abandonment of that â€Å"language† becomes most possible. It is understandable then that the art that came out of Western painting and sculpture is the most energetic, questioning (of its nature), and the least assuming of all the general â€Å"art† concerns. In the final analysis, however, all of the arts have but (in Wittgenstein’s terms) a â€Å"family† resemblance. Yet the various qualities relatable to an â€Å"art condition† possessed by poetry, the novel, the cinema, the theatre, and various forms of mus ic, etc., is that aspect of them most reliable to the function of art as asserted here. Is not the decline of poetry relatable to the implied metaphysics from poetry’s use of â€Å"common† language as an art language?24 In New York the last decadent stages of poetry can be seen in the move by â€Å"Concrete† poets recently toward the use of actual objects and theatre.25 Can it be that they feel the unreality of their art form? We see now that the axioms of a geometry are simply definitions, and that the theorems of a geometry are simply the logical consequences of these definitions. A geometry is not in itself about physical space; in itself it cannot be said to be â€Å"about† anything. But we can use a geometry to reason about physical space. That is to say, once we have given the axioms a physical interpretation, we can proceed to apply the theorems to the objects which satisfy the axioms. Whether a geometry can be applied to the actual physical world or not, is an empirical question which falls outside the scope of geometry itself. There is no sense, therefore, in asking which of the various geometries known to us are false and which are true. Insofar as they are all free from contradiction, they are all true. The proposition which states that a certain application of a geometry is possible is not itself a proposition of that geometry. All that the geometry itself tells us is that if anything can be brought under the definitions, it will also satisfy the theorems. It is therefore a purely logical system, and its propositions are purely analytic propositions. –A. J. Ayer26 Here then I propose rests the viability of art. In an age when traditional philosophy is unreal because of its assumptions, art’s ability to exist will depend not only on its not performing a service – as entertainment, visual (or other) experience, or decoration – which is something easily replaced by kitsch culture, and technology, but, rather, it will remain viable by not assuming a philosophical stance; for in art’s unique character is the capacity to remain aloof from philosophical judgments. It is in this context that art shares similarities with logic, mathematics, and, as well, science. But whereas the other endeavors are useful, art is not. Art indeed exists for its own sake. In this period of man, after philosophy and religion, art may possibly be one endeavor that fulfills what another age might have called â€Å"man’s spiritual needs.† Or, another way of putting it might be that art deals analogously with the state of things â€Å"beyond physics† where philosophy had to make assertions. And art’s strength is that even the preceding sentence is an assertion, and cannot be verified by art. Art’s only claim is for art. Art is the definition of art. NOTES * Reprinted from Studio International (October, 1969). 1 Morton White, The Age of Analysis (New York: Mentor Books), p. 14. 2 Ibid., p. 15. 3 I mean by this Existentialism and Phenomenology. Even Merleau-Ponty, with his middle-of-the-road position between empiricism and rationalism, cannot express his philosophy without the use of words (thus using concepts); and following this, how can one discuss experience without sharp distinctions between ourselves and the world? 4 Sir James Jeans, Physics and Philosophy (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press), p. 17. 5 Ibid., p. 190. 6 Ibid., p. 190. 7 The task such philosophy has taken upon itself is the only â€Å"function† it could perform without making philosophic assertions. 8 This is dealt with in the following section. 9 I would like to make it clear, however, that I intend to speak for no one else. I arrived at these conclusions alone, and indeed, it is from this thinking that my art since 1966 (if not before) evo lved. Only recently did I realize after meeting Terry Atkinson that he and Michael Baldwin share similar, though certainly not identical, opinions to mine. 10 Webster’s New World Dictionary of the American Language. 11 The conceptual level of the work of Kenneth Noland, Jules Olitski, Morris Louis, Ron Davis, Anthony Caro, John Hoyland, Dan Christensen, et al., is so dismally low, that any that is there is supplied by the critics promoting it. This is seen later. 12 Michael Fried’s reasons for using Greenberg’s rationale reflect his background (and most of the other formalist critics) as a â€Å"scholar,† but more of it is due to his desire, I suspect, to bring his scholarly studies into the modern world. One can easily sympathize with his desire to connect, say, Tiepolo with Jules Olitski. One should never forget, however, that a historian loves history more than anything, even art. 13 Lucy Lippard uses this quotation in a footnote to Ad Reinhardt’s retrospective catalogue, January, 1967, p. 28. 14 Lucy Lippard, â€Å"Constellation by Harsh Daylight: The Whitney Annual,† Hudson Review, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Spring, 1968). 15 Arthur R. Rose, â€Å"Four Interviews,† Arts Magazine (February, 1969). 16 As Terry Atkinson pointed out in his introduction to Art-Language (Vol. 1, No. 1), the Cubists never questioned if art had morphological characteristics, but which ones in painting were acceptable. 17 When someone â€Å"buys† a Flavin he isn’t buying a light show, for if he was he could just go to a hardware store and get the goods for considerably less. He isn’t â€Å"buying† anything. He is subsidizing Flavin’s activity as an artist. 18 A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic (New York: Dover Publications), p. 78. 19 Ibid., p. 57. 20 Ibid., p. 57. 21 Ibid., p.90. 22 Ibid., p. 94. 23 Ad Reinhardt’s retrospective catalogue (Jewish Museum, January, 1967) written by Lucy Lippard, p. 12. 24 It is poetry’s use of common language to attempt to say the unsayable that is problematic, not any inherent problem in the use of language within the context of art. 25 Ironically, many of them call themselves â€Å"Conceptual Poets.† Much of this work is very similar to Walter de Maria’s work and this is not coincidental; de Maria’s work functions as a kind of â€Å"object† poetry, and his intentions are very poetic: he really wants his work to change men’s lives. 26 Op. cit., p. 82.

Overview of the Children of Helen of Troy

In Greek mythology, Helen of Troy was the most beautiful (mortal) woman in the world, the Face That Launched a Thousand Ships. But what was it like having her as a mother? Was she a Mommie Dearest nightmare or a doting dame†¦or somewhere in between? Hermione the Heartbreaker Helen’s most famous child is her daughter, Hermione, whom she had with her first husband, Menelaus of Sparta. Her mother abandoned little Hermy to run off with the Trojan Prince Paris; as Euripides tells us in his tragedy Orestes: She was â€Å"the little daughter she had left behind when she sailed off with Paris to Troy.† Orestes, Helen’s nephew, says that, while Helen was â€Å"away† and Menelaus was chasing her down, Hermione’s aunt Clytemnestra (Helen’s half-sister) raised the little girl. But Hermione was fully-grown by the time Telemachus paid Menelaus a visit in the Odyssey. As Homer recounts, â€Å"He was sending Hermione as bride to Neoptolemus, son of Achilles, that breaker of ranks of men, for he had promised her to him, and sworn an oath at Troy, and now the gods brought it about.† The Spartan princess was quite the looker, just like her mom—Homer claims her â€Å"beauty was golden Aphrodite’s†Ã¢â‚¬â€but that marriage didn’t last. Other sources have different accounts of Hermione’s marriage. In Orestes, she’s promised to Neoptolemus, but Apollo proclaims that her cousin Orestes—who holds her hostage for her father’s good behavior in the play—will wed her. Apollo tells Orestes, â€Å"Furthermore, Orestes, your Fate declares that you will marry the woman at whose throat you are holding your sword. Neoptolemus, who thinks that he will marry her, will not do so.† Why is that? Because Apollo prophesies Neoptolemus will kick the bucket at the god’s sanctuary of Delphi when the young man goes to ask for â€Å"satisfaction for the death of Achilles, his father.† Hermione the Home-Wrecker? In another of his plays, Andromache, Hermione has become a shrew, at least as it related to how she treated Andromache. That woman was the widow of the Trojan hero Hector, enslaved after the war and forcibly â€Å"given† to Neoptolemus as his concubine. In the tragedy, Andromache complains, â€Å"My lord abandoned my bed, the bed of a slave, and married the Spartan Hermione, who now torments me with her cruel abuse.† Why did the wife hate her hubby’s slave? Hermione accuses Andromache â€Å"of using drugs of magic powers against her, of making her barren and of making her husband despise her.† Andromache adds, â€Å"She says I’m trying to force her out of the palace so that I can take over as its rightful mistress.† Then, Hermione proceeds to mock Andromache, dubbing her a barbarian and making fun of her plight as her husband’s slave, cruelly quipping, â€Å"And so, I can speak to you all as a free woman, indebted to no one!† Andromache fires back that Hermione was as much of a shrew as her mom: â€Å"Wise children must avoid the habits of their evil mothers!† In the end, Hermione regrets her heinous words against Andromache and her sacrilegious plots to pull the Trojan widow from the sanctuary of Thetis (Neoptolemus’s divine grandmother), violating the right of sanctuary Andromache had invoked by clinging to Thetis’s statue. An undercover Orestes arrives on the scene, and Hermione, fearful of her hubby’s retribution, pleads with him to help her get away from her husband, whom she thinks will punish her for plotting to kill Andromache and her kid by Neoptolemus.   Hermione beseeches her cousin, â€Å"I beg you, Orestes, in the name of our mutual father, Zeus, take me away from here!† Orestes agrees, claiming Hermione actually belonged to him because they were engaged before her father promised her to Neoptolemus, but Orestes was in a bad way—having killed his mom and being cursed for it—at the time. At the end of the play, not only does Orestes take Hermione away with him, but he also plots to ambush Neoptolemus at Delphi, where he’ll kill the king and make Hermione his wife. Off-screen, they get married; with hubby number two, Orestes, Hermione had a son named Tisamenus. The kid didn’t have such good luck when it came to being a king; the descendants of Heracles kicked him out of Sparta. Under-the-Radar Rugrats What about Helen’s other children? Some versions of her story feature her abduction at an early age by the Athenian king Theseus, who’d sworn a pact with his BFF Pirithous that each of them would abduct a daughter of Zeus. The poet Stesichorus claims that Theseus’s rape of Helen produced a little girl, Iphigenia, whom Helen gave to her sister to raise to maintain her own virginal image; that was the same girl whom her purported father, Agamemnon, sacrificed to get to Troy. So Helen’s daughter may have been murdered to get her mother back. Most versions of Helen’s tale, though, feature Hermione as Helen’s only child. In the eyes of the heroic Greeks, that would’ve made Helen a failure at her one and only job: producing a male child for her husband. Homer mentions in the Odyssey that Menelaus made his illegitimate son Megapenthes his heir, noting that â€Å"his son [was] the dearly beloved child of a slave, for the gods, gave Helen no more issue, once she had borne that lovely girl Hermione.† But one ancient commentator says that Helen had two kids: â€Å"Hermione and her youngest-born, Nicostratus, a scion of Ares.† Pseudo-Apollodorus confirms, â€Å"Now Menelaus had by Helen a daughter Hermione and, according to some, a son Nicostratus.† A later commentator suggests Helen and Menelaus had another little boy, Pleisthenes, whom she took with her when she fled to Troy, adding that Helen also bore Paris a son named Aganus. Another account mentions that Helen and Paris had three kids—Bunomus, Corythus, and Idaeus—but sadly, these boys died when the roof of the family home in Troy collapsed. R.I.P. Helen’s boys.